Posts Tagged ‘ Ludwig van Beethoven ’

Beethoven’s deafness and his Ghost trio

In 1808 Beethoven was 38 and his deafness was well advanced. Maybe I am not the only one who conceived his disability in an idealized way: the Titan of music could slay the demon that made it impossible to hear his own genius. The reality was both more grim and more pathetic. Composer and violinist Louis Spohr was in Beethoven’s house at a rehearsal for Beethoven’s most recent piano trio, one that would be published as Opus 70 no. 1. It would be the seventh of his 10 published piano trios. Spohr recorded in his diary how the rehearsal went:

It was not an enjoyable experience. To begin with, the piano was terribly out of tune, a fact which troubled Beethoven not at all, as he could not hear it. Furthermore, little or nothing remained of the brilliant technique which used to be so admired. In the loud passages the poor deaf man hammered away at the notes smudging whole groups of them, and one lost all sense of the melody unless one could follow the score. I felt deeply moved by the tragedy of it all. Beethoven’s almost continual melancholy was no longer a mystery to me.

Beethoven did not give up public performance altogether for another three years. Perhaps the combination of his loyal friends protecting him and his prickly personality warding off his critics kept him from the knowledge that his playing was unprofessional. Maybe he did not care what the public thought. At least something of that attitude was necessary to allow him to explore a musical terrain that most of his listeners were uncomfortable with, even if the resulting music were played by virtuosos.

The Trio in D he was practicing that night is at the beginning of the later explorations. The two statements in the first two movements are not developed traditionally, one after the other, before they are allowed to interact. Instead, they appear almost simultaneously, something that in the day would seem somewhat like disorder. But Beethoven would continue picking at the rules that governed musical development in Vienna until in the end, in his final quarters there would be nothing left, or at least nothing that Hadyn would recognize. More startling is the extreme slowness of the middle movement. It is the dirge-tempo that that gave the trio its nickname, “Ghost.” Roger Fiske writes of this movement:

To get even a moderate amount of movement into his music, Beethoven has to resort to large numbers of hemi-demi-semiquavers which give the pages a forbidding appearance. This need not deter the listener, who can here enjoy one of Beethoven’s darkest movements; he is aiming at Gothic gloom on the grandest possible scale and achieving it with tremendous power.”

Hear for yourself in a recording by Isaac Stern (violin), Eugene Istomin (piano) and Leonard Rose (cello):

The second movement begins around the 6:33 mark.

Note

Quotation of Roger Fiske from Robertson, Alec (ed.), Chamber Music (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1957), p. 102.

The Ephemeral with Hugo von Hofmannsthal in Fin de Siècle Vienna

Hugo von Hofmannsthal at 19 in 1893. (Wikipedia.) Click to enlage.

Hugo von Hofmannsthal at 19 in 1893. (Wikipedia.) Click to enlage.

Last time, we looked at a German who was a prominent member of the first generation of poets to write in vernacular German. Hofmann von Hofmannswaldau lived during the greatest physical destruction of Germany (before the twentieth century) but because he was connected with the Austrian victors, he and his poetry were little affected by the catastrophe.

Today we look at an Austrian poet, writing in German, at a time when Austrian cultural traditions were about to unravel, years before Austria would be first dismantled then destroyed by its association with Germany. The time was the late nineteenth century, and the poet was the young Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874-1929). Both the Baroque and the Late Romantic poems in these two posts deal with transience. (And both, in different ways, are connected to Sigmund Freud.)

Hofmannsthal is known today, if at all, as the librettist of several Richard Strauss operas, notably Elektra and Der Rosenkavalier. The former is a powerful psychological probing of rage-induced madness set to a highly chromatic score; the latter is an acquired taste (one that I have yet to acquire). In his day he was known mainly as a playwright. But Hofmannsthal never saw himself as an entertainer and had no illusions about his popularity. In 1908 (admittedly at the early stages of his stage career) he told an American, “I realize that I write for only about five hundred people in Europe.”1

Before he devoted himself to the stage, Hofmannsthal was the preeminent poet of fin de siècle Vienna.

If fin de siècle Vienna is what is on the other side of a giant wall separating overly refined, highly wrought Romanticism from Modernism, then Hofmannsthal never made it to this side of the wall. He had no interest in making the attempt. In this respect he resembled Strauss, who never ventured into the new music. But Hofmannsthal haled from Vienna, where Klimpt, Kokoschka, Otto Wagner, Schoenberg (at the time Schönberg), Berg and Webern, and others were all at various times  and to different extents midwifing modernism. And of course, the man who discovered and interpreted the unconscious irrationality of humanity, the aspect that would form the basis of modernity’s view of us, Sigmund Freud, was just beginning to publish his views at the turn of the century. This collection of cultural radicals produced an intellectual revolution as fundamental as anything since the Renaissance. But Hofmannsthal would not be a revolutionary.

Cafe Giensteidl sometime befoe 1897. Photograph by Carl von Zamboni for he illusrated newspaper Die vornehme Welt. From collection of Vienna Museum.

Cafe Giensteidl sometime before 1897. Photograph by Carl von Zamboni for he illustrated newspaper Die vornehme Welt. From collection of Vienna Museum.

It’s even more curious, at first glance, that Hofmannsthal did not join the radicals given that he belonged to something of the literary vanguard, the Jung-Wien (the “Young Vienna” movement). This group of writers of literature and criticism gathered in coffee-houses, under the leadership of playwright and critic Hermann Bahr. The manifesto involved the death of naturalism. Their principal haunt was the Café Griensteidl until it closed in 1897. It was at these meetings that Hofmannsthal met Arthur Schnitzler (who was a member) and Stefan George. After the café closed, the club soon ended, and so did Hofmannsthal’s poetry career.

In the twentieth century he attempted a few novels and tales as well as criticism, but exerted himself largely to those nineteenth century forms, the theater and opera. But for that last decade of the nineteenth century, and only during that time, Hofmannsthal composed a series of compact, highly imaginative poems, gemlike in their polish and dreamlike in their delicacy. They immediately grasp the reader’s attention with vivid images suffused in a mood of impersonal mysticism. A deep wisdom appears to underly each of the poems, but as Elisabeth Walter noted: “They were not written to instruct, but to arouse sensation, to awaken the indescribable.”2

The 2005 production of Der Rosenkavalier by the Los Angeles Opera,. Production directed by Maximilian Schell.

The 2005 production of Der Rosenkavalier by the Los Angeles Opera,. Production directed by Maximilian Schell.

His poetry is not idiosyncratic, but it has personal characteristics (although not personal references). This can be described as his style, but style was not a decoration. “Style with him is not a trick, but a gift; the mood clothes itself with the fitting expression, that is all one can say. As the mood is so often somber, the sound of the words is correspondingly sonorous and full of gloomy dignity.”3

Hofmannsthal’s poetry is filled with symbols, although he was not a Symbolist. It is true that Hofmannsthal said that his most important influence was Stefan George. Hofmannsthal said of George: “He so completely conquered life, so absolutely mastered it, that from his poems the rare, indescribable peace and refreshing coolness of a still, dark temple are wafted upon our noise-racked senses.”4 George himself was closely affiliated with Mallarmé  and Verlaine. But the symbols in Hofmannsthal’s poems were not the flamboyant dressings to the obscure referents of an aesthete. (See for example Mallarmé’s “Tristesse d’été,” which I translate and comment on here, although that poem is hardly the most gaudy of the output of the Symbolists.) Rather, Hofmannsthal’s symbols were the images steeped in primal meaning, the ones that float in our dreams. And as we’ll see in today’s poem, the verses themselves are dreamlike, tightly written, with simple, recurring vocabulary, and as in the most haunting dreams, the symbols transform themselves with new uses in order to suggest more fully their meaning.

The great Austrian novelist (and critic, among other things) Hermann Broch says that Hofmannsthal’s “rapport with symbols” showed that he was a child of his time. (In this quotation Broch is referring Hofmannsthal’s stage pieces and in particular two works from 1895 and 1919, respectively, but his specific references are not important, as we’ll see later):

“A work as early as The Tale of the 672d Night probes into a symbolic realm whose reality would reveal itself to him more deeply with every year of his life. The Woman Without a Shadow forms the pinnacle of his voyage of discovery into the primal forest of symbols. But is this primal forest at all penetrable? Baudelaire’s primal symbols foreshadow it; they are like screams breaking through into the world of man from the solid impenetrability of an unreachable, faraway jungle. Hofmannsthal entered the jungle, but proves that it is not that of the primal forest; no, it is a symbolic garden and nevertheless a primal garden, perhaps the primal garden. For the voyage to the symbolic occurs in dream, and not only are these dreams remarkably refined and even ceremonious; they are totally so—how could it be otherwise with Hofmannsthal?—when they make their appearance as dream within dream and even as a dream transposed to the stage.”5

Stefan George, photographed in 1893. Click to enlarge.

Stefan George, photographed in 1893. Click to enlarge.

As for Stefan George, who published Hofmannsthal’s poems and even portions of some verse plays in his Blaette fuer die Kunst (the journal had highly stylized orthography), while Hofmannsthal admired his meandering, flowing lines and his hazy images, Hofmannsthal did not subscribe to belief that art was something spiritual or a substitute religion. And he certainly did not believe that the artist was a high priest, as George thought of himself. Hofmannsthal thought of art as a way to truth and never confused it for truth itself. George’s mistake in this regard is why he became (against his own intention) a favorite of Nazis later on. And despite Hofmannsthal’s fondness for George’s poetry, he didn’t need George to show him the work of the Symbolists or any other modern writers because he knew them before they met.

In fact, even before he met the Jung-Wien his poetry was strikingly mature and individual. And yet it epitomized the fin de siècle. When he first read his verses at the Café Griensteidl, the members of Vienna’s new literature movement were astounded. Schnitzler recorded later:

“We had never heard verses of such perfection, such faultless plasticity, such musical feeling, from any living being, nor had we thought them possible since Goethe. But more wondrous than this unique mastery of form (which has never since been achieved by anyone else in the German language) was his knowledge of the world, which could only have come from a magical intuition in a youth whose days were spent sitting on a school bench.”

Lest Schnitzler’s praise seem over-the-top, Zweig wrote that Hofmannsthal was one “in whom our youth saw not only its highest ambition but also absolute poetic perfection come into being …”6

Weiner Akademisches Gymnasium from Moritz Bermann, Alt- und Neu-Wien. Geschichte der Kaiserstadt und ihrer Umgebungen (Vienna: U. Hartleben’s Verlag: 1880). Click to enlarge.

Weiner Akademisches Gymnasium from Moritz Bermann, Alt- und Neu-Wien: Geschichte der Kaiserstadt und ihrer Umgebungen (Vienna: U. Hartleben’s Verlag: 1880). Click to enlarge.

Perhaps the most astonishing thing about the debut of this new Goethe was that he was 17 at the time, and he would complete his entire poetic career before he was 25. And in none of the poetry is there any trace of immaturity, confessional egocentrism or mawkish sentimentality. Broch attributed Hofmannsthal’s remarkable poetic maturity to his being a “Wunderkind, wunderschauendes Kind7 (a prodigy, a marvel-gazing child). Aside from the poetry itself , Broch has only thin biographical evidence to support that conclusion. But what anecdotes he has, he spins into a cultural psychoanalysis which places Hofmannsthal near the turning point of nineteenth century European culture and also explains him in a way that a modernist of Broch’s preeminent rank can empathize with.

Broch sees the formation of Hofmannthal’s character take place in the 1880s (when Hofmannsthal was 6-15). Broch finds significant that Hofmannthal was an introvert at the Wiener Akademisches Gymnasium: “Hofmannsthal the schoolboy kept to himself, courteously to be sure and never offensively, yet consistent with the Wunderkind whose unchildlike nature no longer wishes, indeed is no longer able, to have anything in common with the childishness of his peers.”8 Broch supposes that the von in young Hugo’s surname inspired some awe in his teachers in that solidly burgher school. From the attention given to a social superior, and from the fact that “he was mentally far superior [and] better looking than most of the others” “emerged an exceptionality which was justified at least in part but became hypertrophied by young Hofmannrthal’s childlike sensibility and thus burdened his still too weak shoulders with an all too heavy burden, all too proud, indeed almost mystical experience.”9

Into this rarefied air (according to Broch) stepped his father. The elder Hugo Hofmann von Hofmannsthal, lawyer and director of the Wiener Grossbank, filled young Hugo’s head with art, particularly theater. Young Hugo’s father did not see his duty as preparing Hugo for a career. Rather he believed it as necessary to show Hugo the things that made up the full life, and to a wealthy Viennese professional, that meant art, particularly theater and music.  Broch contrasts Hugo’s father with the father of another Austrian who would reside for his brief adult life in Vienna:

Hermann Broch in 19337, one year before his arrest and then escape from the Nazis. © Österreichischer Bundesverlag, Wien. Click to enlarge.

Hermann Broch in 1937, one year before his arrest and then escape from the Nazis. © Österreichischer Bundesverlag, Wien. Click to enlarge.

“The educational influence of Dr. von Hofmann can be compared with the influence Leopold Mozart exerted on his son; the parallel will also show the difference between the two eras. Mozart learned from his father the profession practiced by his father; yet it could hardly have occurred for more than an instant to Dr. Hofmannsthal to prepare his son for the legal profession or, for that matter, for a banking career. He concentrated his guidance far more on imparting Bildung {culture: dkf} and a keen eye [Schaufähigkeit], that is to say, on the development of those abilities through which the leisure hours of the burgher class {the bourgeoisie: dkf} were being transformed to ‘noble enjoyment,’ … Whereas Leopold Mozart wished to bring up his son to be an able musical craftsman and held all other worldly conduct as self-evident and needy of no individual prescription, it was the opposite with Hofmannsthal. His father abstained from any direct interference in the son’s choice of vocation, yet he would certainly have considered it an insult if his son had not followed in his world view. Both Leopold Mozart and Hugo von Hofmann acted ‘morally,’ each in his way; both found reward for their efforts in the genius of the objects of their education; yet it was the difference between the ethical and the aesthetic that proclaimed itself in the goals of their education, the difference between the Mozartean, active and production-directed ‘ethical morality’ on the one hand, the bourgeois ‘aesthetic morality,’ as it can best be called, on the other; for the latter in essence remains directed toward passive ‘appreciation,’ even when it revolves around an appreciation as noble as that of Hofmannsthal.”10

But these are not the only things resulting in Hofmannsthal’s narcissism. Broch (himself the son of wealthy Viennese Jewish parents, but who converted to Roman Catholicism when he was 23) believed that even the Hofmannsthal family’s rejection of Judaism contributed to young Hugo’s perception of “exceptionality.”

“It is well known that there exists a collective narcissism—the principal instrument of all politics—which expresses itself as group consciousness. … Ruling groups, conquering peoples, stabilized upper classes, in short, all who have become ‘style-setting’ exude an ‘aesthetic’ pride, a pride in the specific, corporal ‘beauty’ of the gr0up … In the case of  ‘subjected’ peoples, however, it is somewhat more complicated. They assimilate the style of the national, economic, or however-defined upper class in order to take part in the latter’s narcissism, which is meanwhile compounded by the pride of successful assimilation; hence their one-time humiliating situation can never be forgotten. All assimilated minorities reveal this curious ‘two-tiered’ narcissism, fundamentally a mechanism of overcompensation, yet one that does not eliminate the original sense of inferiority but endeavors to conserve it as a springboard for the joy of compensation. Not only does this type of narcissism in assimilated … minorities surpass that of the upper class; it is, moreover, a throughly knowing self-irony, which the ruling class totally lacks. In this manner the strange ‘inner anti-Semitism’ of assimilated Jewry is a phenomenon of ‘two-tiered narcissism.’ Even after an assimilation achieved through the course of several generations, a ‘nobly isolated’ externality is held onto (if only in the twilight of unconsciousness); and the milieu of assimilation, long familiar as a homeland, is seen through a psychic distance that turns it into something foreign. The assimilated individual thus perceives himself as a chosen one of high degree, a chosen one among the chosen people.”11

So it seems that Hofmannsthal’s narcissism was overdetermined (just as Freud would say that hysteria or the content of dreams were overdetermined). So what conclusion does Broch draw from this evidence for narcissism? Broch believes (based on Hofmannsthal’s “most mature work” (The Tower)) that he had long resented the “bourgeois aesthetic” with which he had been instilled:

“It is clear that already as a child he was led to suffering and confusion by the gap in his education—hedonistic or, at the very least, hedonoid aestheticism alongside morality. This narcissistic, exaggerated set of problems would have been insoluble had the guardian angel of genius not arisen and found the solution. The solution was that of dreams, of the fairy tales embedded in dreams.”12

Death mask of Hermann Broch. Beinkie Library, Yale University.

Death mask of Hermann Broch. Beinkie Library, Yale University.

Hofmannsthal’s life-long use of dream motif was Broch’s principal connection with a man who he otherwise had little interest in. When Broch was first asked to provide the introductory essay to a collection of Hofmannsthal’s writing, he accepted only because he had no other position (his hoped for job at Princeton never materialized). He thought of the project as “financing 1948,” but otherwise found the prospect “repulsive.”13 Broch was living in New Haven trudging away at his “life work,” a study, which he began in 1941, entitled Mass Psychology which attempted to explain the popular appeal of totalitarianism by means of a social psychology rooted in a version of Freudianism (or at least using basic Freudian concepts). Broch’s interest in social psychology pre-dated his own fiction (he published articles first stating his theory of cultural values during and right after World War I). His view of the value of (indeed the morality of) art drastically changed over his life. When he wrote the Hofmannsthal essays, he had concluded that literature no longer provided the means to examine the ethical basis of our time. Nevertheless, his two major novels (which  attempted such a task), both relied on dream concepts for their organization, narrative and message. The Sleepwalkers used unconscious sleep state as the unifying concept of the three novels. The Death of Virgil, completed only after he had escaped the Nazis, is an elaborate dream-hallucination rumination of the meaning of life and art on the Roman poet’s last day. The unconscious life made evident through dreams thus informed all Broch’s works in all the disciplines he attempted. But is his explanation of Hofmannsthal’s dream poetry valid?

The brief biography he gives can of course be interpreted many ways. The use of later theater works to explain young Hugo’s childhood psychology is not outlandish. Freud used the fiction of writers to explain their own psychic makeup, usually coming to conclusions at odds with biography, however. Broch’s attempt is at least as good as Freud’s. But does psychology say anything more than the writing itself suggests, and, if not, what purpose does it serve?

Portrait of Arthur Schnitzler, Atelier Madame d’Ora, 1915. (ONB/Vienna.)

Portrait of Arthur Schnitzler, Atelier Madame d’Ora, 1915. (ONB/Vienna.)

A simpler explanation of Hofmannsthal’s literary career is probably the one Broch held before wrestling with Hofmannsthal in the context of nineteenth century literary culture: Hofmannsthal’s goal was to distinguish himself in the literary tradition most favored by the ancient aristocracy, solely because it was so favored by them. Let’s consider some additional biographical facts. First, Hofmannsthal proved himself to be politically highly conservative. This is shown by the significant fact (omitted in Broch’s essays) that during World War I Hofmannsthal not only held a position in the ministry supporting the Emperor, he also actively supported the Emperor’s war efforts with various propaganda efforts. None of the Jung-Wein and certainly none of the avant-garde displayed anything like this level of identification with imperial Austria. (Broch himself, who was managing his father’s textile manufactures and presumably would have had more economic interest in defending the existing order, took no such actions. He spent the war working with the Austrian Red Cross.) In the pre-war years Hofmannsthal’s works found acceptance by Richard Strauss and other conservatives. The New Music composers, who used verses by Stefan George (and even poets like Maeterlinck, who were less progressive from a literary point of view than Hofmannsthal) never used Hofmannsthal’s poems. Moreover, Hofmannsthal did not simply acquiesce in the conversion of his grandfather to Catholicism: His wife, though Jewish, converted to Catholicism before she married Hofmannsthal. Schnitzler was openly critical of Hofmannsthal’s rejection of his ethnic Judaism. Finally, Hofmannsthal’s own father’s inculcation of young Hugo with things aesthetic was not the “moral” duty of the upper bourgeoisie; if that were the case surely there would have been examples of others. It seems rather that it was the calculated attempt to have young Hugo regain the aristocratic prestige of the family, which faded when Hugo’s grandfather lost the family fortune in the crash of May 1873 and the subsequent Long Depression. Professor Schorske noted how the aristocracy in those days refused to admit to the life of the imperial court those who won a patent of nobility. “Direct social assimilation to the aristocracy occurred rarely in Austria.” Money itself (of which the Hofmannsthals no longer had much) was itself not sufficient.

“But assimilation could be pursued along another, more open road: that of culture. This too had its difficulties. The traditional culture of the Austrian aristocracy was far removed from the legalistic, puritanical culture of both bourgeois and Jew. Profoundly Catholic, it was a sensuous, plastic culture. Where traditional bourgeois culture saw nature as a sphere to be mastered by imposing order under divine law, Austrian aristocratic culture viewed nature as a scene of joy, a manifestation of divine grace to be glorified in art. Traditional Austrian culture was not, like that of the German north, moral, philosophical, and scientific, but primarily aesthetic. Its greatest achievements were in the applied and performing arts: architecture, the theater, and music.”14

The conflict was not between ethics and aesthetics; it was between Jewish bourgeoise ethically informed aesthetics and aristocratic Catholic aesthetics. Hofmannsthal chose aristocratic aesthetics, but to the extent his bourgeois ethical-aesthetics could not be repressed, it was cast in dreamlike form.

Klimt not only painted the classical theater scenes to decorate the new Burgtheater, he showed the audience of the old one. Aristocrats clamored for special sittings to be immortalized as patrons of the theater. (Shorske at 212 n.*.)The Auditorium of the Old Burgtheater. Oil on canvas by Gustav Klimt (1888) (Historisches Museum Der Stadt Wien, Vienna).

Klimt not only painted the classical theater scenes to decorate the new Burgtheater, he showed the audience of the old one. Aristocrats clamored for special sittings to be immortalized as patrons of the theater. (Shorske at 212 n.*.) The Auditorium of the Old Burgtheater. Oil on canvas by Gustav Klimt (1888) (Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien, Vienna).

Of course Hofmannsthal’s rejection of social naturalism was unlikely to have been motivated by the same reason Broch himself would later reject it: its exhaustion as a form and its inability to speak to fundamental “ethical” questions. (Broch spends a great deal of effort in the first of his Hofmannsthal essays explaining his view of the history of European literary and visual art from the middle of the nineteenth century to Joyce and Kafka. The discussion is very dense and like German writing since Kant depends on the juxtaposition of opposites and their resolution. Neither Marx nor Nietzsche had been able to root out Hegel in Broch’s mental structure. I distill one strand of his thought without attempting to replicate the subtlety of his reasoning.) An aspiring aristocrat like Hofmannsthal could hardly help himself advance his cause by producing novels like Zola’s (or even those of the arch-conservative Dostoevsky for that matter, who was at least as anti-Semitic as the Austrian aristocrats, although perhaps not quite as much as the Christian Socialists whose popularity among the petite bourgeoisie rose to the mayoralty in 1897 Karl Leuger, a man later praised in Mein Kampf).

Freud's consulting room at Berggasse 19, Vienna. (One of the clandestine photographs by Edmund Engelmund in 1938.)*

Freud’s consulting room at Berggasse 19, Vienna. (One of the clandestine photographs by Edmund Engelmund in 1938.)

So the imperial theater was the preferred way to regain aristocratic prestige, and that was Hofmanntsthal’s aim from early on (he wrote verse dramas even while producing lyrical poems for the Jung-Wein). He used dream-motivs in his poems and plays, not because it was the inspiration of the personification of some psychic savior, but because dreams were everywhere in fin-de-siècle Vienna. They were the medium of transcendence and constituted the essence of psychic life. The Hofburgtheater itself was not simply the nobility’s metaphor of a dream, but it was itself, in its own national repertory, composed of dream. Austria’s greatest playwright was Franz Grillparzer, a Romantic so imposing that his oratorio graced Beethoven’s funeral. Gillparzer’s masterpiece, Der Traum, ein Leben (“A Dream, a Life”), was based on the seventeenth century play from Spain’s Golden Age, La vida es sueño (“Life is a Dream”) by Pedro Calderón de la Barca, the existential drama often compared with Hamlet.  Hofmannsthal undoubtedly saw the play as a young boy. Even if he did not, clearly he studied Grillparzer (and his immediate disciples) because Gillparzer is the link between Hofmannsthal and Goethe both in the selection of dramatic material, the artistic view of the material and the nature of the verse used in the dramas. “As Goethe introduced modern characterization into the story of Iphigenia, Grillparzer followed with his plays on Hero and Leander, Sappho, and Medea.”15 In all of these, the psychology of the actors were examined. Hofmannsthal would follow with his own examinations of classics, the most notable being Elektra. His close reading of Grillprazer led him to publish in 1915 a collection of Grillparzer’s poems: Grillparzers politisches Vermächtnis (Leipzig : Insel-Verlag, [1915]). In his study of Grillparzer, Hofmannsthal could hardly have ignored Grillparzer’s great attachment to Calderón. Hofmannsthal himself explored the relation of life and dreams and dreaming from early on, and their equation is found in much of his lyrical poetry. (See, for example, “Leben, Traum, und Tod,” “Life, Dream and Death.”)

Dreams were not confined to theater in the last decade of the nineteenth century in Vienna, however. Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams was published in 1899. Broch’s own fascination with dreams as both metaphor and entrance to unconscious both in literature and in his social psychology work stemmed from Freud’s work and techniques. Freud himself was undoubtedly guided in his own thinking by the dreams that were everywhere in Vienna, but that is for another story.

*     *     *

That Hofmannsthal was goaded by ambition (isn’t ambition the very lifespring of the burgher?) and that the dream life of Hofmannsthal’s poems were not dictated by the Angel of Genius does not mean that the works are trivial. They are immediately arresting, but at the same time are composed with a subtlety that bears careful analysis. The poem today illustrates these points.

The poem is named for its form: the terza rima. This form, perfected, if not invented by Dante for the Divine Comedy, is made up of three-lines stanzas where the first and third lines rhyme. The second line rhymes with the first and third lines of the next stanza, so on until the end. In this poem Hofmannsthal doesn’t interlock the stanzas in the first part, but does rhyme the first and third lines. In the final three parts the stanzas are interlocked.

The dream of the poem is created by the simple language (a child’s?) describing familiar objects in odd settings or described with in a way to emphasize their strangeness. The dog in the first part is alien (fremd) because it is (permanently?) silent. This inability to speak, voicelessness, is repeated twice more in different visions. Both times it adds to the strangeness of the image. Inability to express oneself and the inadequacy of language became central themes in Hofmannsthal’s later works. Indeed, his famous Lord Chandos Letter published at about the time that Hofmannsthal concludes his lyric poetry career but before he committed himself entirely to the stage, tells the story of an Elizabethan writer who has “lost completely the ability to think or speak of anything coherently.” Nearly two decades later, in 1921, the main character in his play The Difficult Man (Der Schwierige (Berlin: S. Fischer: 1922)) concludes that language is not merely useless but improper in the face of the enormity of the human condition:

“Everything one utters is indecent. Merely to put anything into words is an indecency. And when one looks at it closely, my dear Aldo, except that men never look closely at anything in the world, there is something positively shameless in our daring even to experience some things.”

Everything has a strangeness, no matter how familiar. It is the nature of the “Thing.” Each Thing whether a mute dog or the full moon over the tree tops is “an uninterpretable interpretability” (as he writes in his Buch der Freunde (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag: 1922). We can understand the Thing without being able to explain it. Everyone confronts external reality, and our only connection with it is the Dream.

The content of the poem (its “ethical” component in Broch’s language) suggests that the transience of life is not, as Hofmannswaldau saw it, the end of things beautiful and precious, but rather in their transformation into other Things. What relieves us of despair is the knowledge of our connection with some others by descent and all other things by physical action, like the fertilizing power of the martyr’s blood. While we may not comprehend it, Life itself is fully aware of its own logic and power.

Terzinen
Über Verganglichkeit

from Gedichte
(Leipzig: Insel-Verlag: 1922)

by Hugo von Hofmannsthal

I

Noch spür ich ihren Atem auf den Wangen:
Wie kann das sein, daß diese nahen Tage
Fort sind, für immer fort, und ganz vergangen?

Dies ist ein Ding, das keiner voll aussinnt,
Und viel zu grauenvoll, als daß man klage:
Daß alles gleitet und vorüberrinnt

Und daß mein eignes Ich, durch nichts gehemmt,
Herüberglitt aus einem kleinen Kind
Mir wie ein Hund unheimlich stumm und fremd.

Dann: daß ich auch vor hundert Jahren war
Und meine Ahnen, die im Totenhemd,
Mit mir verwandt sind wie mein eignes Haar,

So eins mit mir als wie mein eignes Haar.

II

Die Stunden! wo wir auf das helle Blauen
Des Meeres starren und den Tod verstehn,
So leicht und feierlich und ohne Grauen,

Wie kleine Mädchen, die sehr blaß aussehn,
Mit großen Augen, und die immer frieren,
An einem Abend stumm vor sich hinsehn

Und wissen, daß das Leben jetzt aus ihren
Schlaftrunknen Gliedern still hinüberfließt
In Bäum’ und Gras, und sich matt lächelnd zieren

Wie eine Heilige, die ihr Blut vergießt.

III

Wir sind aus solchem Zeug, wie das zu Träumen,
Und Träume schlagen so die Augen auf
Wie kleine Kinder unter Kirschenbäumen,

Aus deren Krone den blaßgoldnen Lauf
Der Vollmond anhebt durch die große Nacht.
… Nicht anders tauchen unsre Träume auf,

Sind da und leben wie ein Kind, das lacht,
Nicht minder groß im Auf- und Niederschweben
Als Vollmond, aus Baumkronen aufgewacht.

Das Innerste ist offen ihrem Weben,
Wie Geisterhände in versperrtem Raum
Sind sie in uns und haben immer Leben.

Und drei sind Eins: ein Mensch, ein Ding, ein Traum.

IV

Zuweilen kommen niegeliebte Frauen
Im Traum als kleine Mädchen uns entgegen
Und sind unsäglich rührend anzuschauen,

Als wären sie mit uns auf fernen Wegen
Einmal an einem Abend lang gegangen,
Indes die Wipfel atmend sich bewegen

Und Duft herunterfällt und Nacht und Bangen,
Und längs des Weges, unsres Wegs, des dunkeln,
Im Abendschein die stummen Weiher prangen

Und, Spiegel unsrer Sehnsucht, traumhaft funkeln,
Und allen leisen Worten, allem Schweben
Der Abendluft und erstem Sternefunkeln

Die Seelen schwesterlich und tief erbeben
Und traurig sind und voll Triumphgepränge
Vor tiefer Ahnung, die das große Leben

Begreift und seine Herrlichkeit und Strenge.

Terzas Rimas
On the Transitory

[translated by DK Fennell]

I

Still yet I feel their breathing on my cheeks:
So how is it that these quite recent days
Are gone, forever gone, and wholly lost?

This is the thing that no one clearly sees,
And much too full of horror to lament:
That all there is slips by, then goes away,

That everything I am, without restraint
Is emanated from a little child
Unnatural as a silent, foreign hound.

And more: I lived a hundred years ago,
And all my forbears (long now wrapped in shrouds),
Relate to me just as my very hair,

Are one with me just as my very hair.

II

And oh the hours! When we on sun-lit blue
At sea observe and comprehend our death
So light, so free of care, without the least despair,

Like little girls with striking pallid skin
And big round eyes, and always seeming cold,
Each silent, staring straight ahead at dusk,

And knowing that right now the very life
From out their weary limbs is flowing forth
To trees and grass, to dress them with sad smile

Just like a martyr pouring out her blood.

III

We are from stuff that dreams come from as well,
And dreams have eyes that open in this way:
Like little children under cherry trees,

Along the pallid golden path on top
The waxing moon appears through darkest night.
… No other way do dreams appear to us,

Here they live just like a laughing child,
No less sublime when wafting up and down,
Than is the moon awaking through treetops.

The inner life is open to their plait,
Like phantom’s hands inside a locked up room
They are inside of us and always live.

And three are one: the man, the thing, the dream.

IV

Sometimes the women who were never loved
Appear to us in dreams as little girls,
Unutterably touching to behold,

As though with us upon a distant path
One time at evening quite a while ago,
All while the trees bestir themselves with sighs

And fragrance settles down and night and fears,
Along the path, our very path, unlit,
In evening luster twinkle silent ponds

And, mirror to our longing, dreamlike wink,
And all the gentle words, all things afloat
In evening air as well the first star-gleam

Like sisters do, their souls profoundly shake
And they are sad but full of jubilance
Before an inner thought, that Life Itself

Perceives its very majesty and strength.

*      *      *

Italian is easier to rhyme than German (and so Dante could complete a three volume epic in (terzas rimas), and German is easier than English, not only because more words and word-forms rhyme, but also because in English it is more difficult to put rhyming words in the end position of lines. I therefore have omitted rhyming here, because otherwise the laconic visions would be disturbed. Compare the rhymed version, as close to literal as the rhyme scheme allowed, by Charles Wharton Stork:16

Of Mutability [Terzinen I].

Still, still upon my cheek I feel their breath:
How can it be that days which seem so near
Are gone, forever gone, and lost in death?

This is a thing that none may rightly grasp,
A thing too dreadful for the trivial tear:
That all things glide away from out our clasp;—

And that this I, unchecked by years, has come
Across into me from a little child,
Like an uncanny creature, strangely dumb;—

That I existed centuries past—somewhere,
That ancestors on whom the earth is piled
Are yet as close to me as my very hair.

As much a part of me as my very hair.

Death [Terzinen II].

What hours are those! when, shiningly outspread,
The ocean lures us, and we lightly learn
The solemn lore of death, and feel no dread:

As little girls, whose great eyes seem to yearn,
Girls that have pallid cheeks and limbs a-cold,
Some evening look far out and do not turn

Their feebly-smiling gaze, for, loosing hold
Upon their slumber-drunken limbs, the flood
Of life glides over into grass and wold;—

Or as a saint pours out her martyr blood.

“Such Stuff as Dreams” [Terzinen III],

Such stuff as dreaming is we mortals be,
And every dream doth open wide its eyes
Like a small child beneath a cherry tree,

Above whose top across the deepening skies
The pale full-moon emerges for its flight.
Not otherwise than so our dreams arise.

They live as a child that laughs, and to the sight
Appear no smaller on their curving way
Than the full-moon awakening on the night.

Our inmost self is open to their sway.
As spirit hands in sealed chambers gleam
They dwell in us and have their life alway.

And three are one: the man, the thing, the dream.

Note on Text: You see that Stork only translates the first three parts of the poem. The reason is that he translated from the 1907 edition of the collected poems of Hofmannsthal, which did not include the fourth part. In fact, I have been unable to find a published version of the fourth part before the 1922 edition (the one I used). The publication history of the poem is somewhat curious. Evidently the first publication was in 1895 in Stefan George’s Blätter für die Kunst (Leaves for Art or Album for Art). The individual issues of this journal were circulated only among a small circle, so I cannot tell what the original version was. But the collected volume for the years 1892-1898, published by Georg Bondi in Berlin in 1899 (entitled: Blaetter fuer die Kunst: Eine Auslese aus den Jahren 1892-98) contains only the first part of the poem (on page 73) under the title “Terzinen über Vergänglichkeit.” That version is the same as Part I above, except for the idiosyncratic orthography of G. Bondi, where nouns are not capitalized, the double s is used instead of the ligature symbol ß, and a general carelessness with commas (although in this version the commas are identical to the version in the 1922 edition). G. Bondi as Verlag der Blaetter fuer die Kunst in Berlin published two editions of the collected poems of Hofmannsthal (Ausgewaehlte Gedichte) in 1903 and 1904. Those versions show the carelessness with the commas (which are represented by a middle dot). The first three parts of the poem are included in these two collections. Thereafter, Insel-Verlag in Leipzig published Hofmannsthal’s collected poems. The following version have only the first three parts (and they use the orthography as in the text above): Die gesammelten Gedichte (1907) (pp. 19-21); Die Gedichte und kleinen Dramen (1911) (pp. 14-15); Die Gedichte und kleinen Dramen (1916, stated to be the 3rd edition) (pp. 14-15); and Die Gedichte und kleinen Dramen (1919, stated to be the fifth edition) (pp. 14-15). I was unable to located either the second or fourth editions, but since the three I did see seemed to use the same plates, it’s unlikely the other two editions differed in any way. The next edition is the one I use, called simply Gedichte on the title page and Die geammelten Gedichte on the succeeding page. The poem is found on pages 26-28. Before this edition the title “Über Vergänglichkeit” is placed under the Roman I. In this edition the title comes first and is the title for the complete four part poem.

Notes

1Charles Wharton Stork (trans. & ed.), The Lyrical Poems of Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Yale University Press: 1918), p. 17. [“Stork”]

2Elisabeth Walter, “Hugo von Hofmannsthal, an Exponent of Modern Lyricism,” Colonnade (December 1916). [“Walter”]

3Stork at 19.

4Walter.

5Hermann Broch, Hugo von Hofmannsthal and his Time: The European Imagination, 1860-1920, translated and edited by Michael P. Steinberg (University of Chicago Press: ©1984), p. 151. [“Broch”]

6J.D. McClatchy, The Whole Diifference: Selected Writings of Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Princeton University Press: 2008), p. 4.

7Broch at 192 n.3.

8Broch at 89-90.

9Broch at 89.

10Broch at 87-88.

11Broch at 90.

12Broch at 91.

13Broch at 4 (Steinberg’s introduction).

14Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Siècle Vienna (NY: Viking Books: 1981), p. 7. [“Schorske”]

15Stork at 4.

16Stork  at 34-36.

Random, half-baked generalities about Bach

Yesterday I did something that is always fraught with danger. I had a lengthy discussion with a musician about Bach. There are two dangers in such an enterprise. First, everyone involved finds themselves inevitably using one of these concepts: architecture, God, cosmos, DNA, mathematics, genius. I think all of those terms were used yesterday. But in our defense, even Beethoven was reduced to calling Bach the “immortal god of harmony.”

Second, if you participate in any such discussion, and it lasts any length of time, you are compelled to disclose a half-baked theory that you’ve been harboring about the “essence” of Bach. And our talk yesterday went past the tipping point. She explained that based on her study of the unaccompanied violin works, the essence was how seemlessly he moved from one tonal center to another, without the listener knowing it until the transition had already happened. (She likened his overall tonal scheme to moving from one galaxy to another.) To her this was important because she said that the same part of the ear that detects or resolves tonality is the part that governs the body’s balance. (Is this why music and dance are always associated? Even German music that isn’t “dancable” hews closely to the French dance forms, like Bach’s cello suites or Haydn’s “Seven Last Words of Christ.”) So the ear should be able to detect a change in key, as for example, it can readily do in the 12 Telemann violin fantasies. But Bach uses some as-yet-undiscovered-by-her device to “mask” the change, and she is planning on finding it out. (One way I’ve noticed this is accomplished is by the use of a rapid line (say eighth note or sixteenth notes) with large intervals between notes so that he can artfully use accidentals to “step” away from one key to another. If the notes were closer together the modulation would be easier to detect.)

My own half-baked theory was that being steeped in the fugue (and fugue-like forms) early and through-out his life strongly influenced (in a way I have yet to fully explain) his “melody” or thematic construction in all his works. My thinking goes as followings: Whenever one makes a piece with more than one voice and expects the second voice to come in using the same statement (or one manipulated in the way that the rules of the fugue allow) and overlap part of the statement of the first voice, the “architecture” of the statement has to be such that it accommodates the harmonies that will result from the overlap. In medieval music the vocal lines were not designed to produce the same kind of euharmonious effect (if you will permit a neologism just for this purpose) that Bach intended. Therefore medieval music will contain all sorts of startling (but accidental) dissonances. (It is Bach’s reduction of these unplanned dissonances that forms Adrian Leverkühn’s complaint that Bach destroyed polyphony in Mann’s Doktor Faustus.) So two characteristics of Bach’s “melody” lines (for example, even in arias in the cantatas, which are not designed to produce the counterpoint of the fugues or fugue-like pieces) are that they are long and their parts are self-referential (in a way I have not worked out). Now the counter-evidence for this “theory” is the Musikalisches Opfer, BWV 1079. Bach took a melody written by Frederick the Great — a melody that was probably not designed for counterpoint because Frederick thought the old Bach was somewhat old-fashioned in his devotion to these old forms — and Bach was able to create a “fugue” with up to 6 voices. The human mind is nothing if not able to protect its own creations, so I attribute that to Bach’s unearthly ability to make fugues by that point in his career and still maintain that if Bach wrote the “melodic” statement himself, it would have been better. Besides, he manipulates the statement in such a way (I convince myself) that he is able to use it just like he would have used his own statement.

The conversation never came to any conclusion, so it was in fact much like Die Kunst der Fuge, BWV 1080, where Bach allows the performer to provide his own ending. But, since, unlike Bach, there was no correct ending to the conversation, I will include here a description of one of the canons of Musikalisches Opfer by meta-metatician Douglas Hofstadter from his Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (NY: 1979), p10. He uses it to introduce his concept of “strange loops,” but for now, I’ll use it to merge the two concepts discussed yesterday, the modulation of keys and the construction of fugues, in this case the more simplified “canons” (all in the context of the Musikaisches Opfer):

“There is one canon in the Musical Offering which is particularly unusual. Labeled simply “Canon per Tonos,” it has three voices. The uppermost voice sings a variant of the Royal Theme, while underneath it, two voices provide a canonic harmonization based on a second theme. The lower of this pair sings its theme in C  minor (which is the key of the canon as a whole), and the upper of the pair sings the same theme displaced upwards in pitch by an interval of a fifth. What makes this canon different from any other, however, is that when it concludes — or, rather, seems to conclude — it is no longer in the key of C minor, but now is in D minor. Somehow Bach has contrived to modulate (change keys) right under the listener’s nose. And it is so constructed that this ‘ending’ ties smoothly onto the beginning again: thus one can repeat the process and return in the key of E, only to join again to the beginning. These successive modulations lead the ear in increasingly remote provinces of tonality, so that after several of them, one would expect to be hopelessly far away from the starting key. And yet magically, after exactly six such modulations, the original key of C minor has been restored! All the voices are exactly one octave higher than they were at the beginning, and here the piece may be broken off in a musically agreeable way. Such, one imagines, was Bach’s intention but Bach indubitably also relished the implication that this process could go on ad infinitum, which is perhaps why he wrote in the margin ‘As the modulation rises, so may the King’s Glory.'”

Bach is probably more deviously intricate than we will every know. That’s why we always revert to generalizations. Note that Hofstadter doesn’t  explain the mechanism of the modulation and only calls it “magic.” All these generalizations mean only one thing: We are slack-jawed in awe and admiration of what Bach’s mind was capable of.

Four versions of Luther (I)

Last week was the 590th anniversary of Exsurge Domine. (It was only a close application to the Walt Whitman comments and a seeming never ending effort to finalize the much-needed second part to the Darwin-Smith series that prevented me from noting the anniversary at the proper time.)

Exsurge Domine (“Arise O Lord”) was the Bull of Pope Leo X issued June 15, 1520, which enjoined Martin Luther from preaching and threatened him with excommunication if he did not publicly recant 41 stated errors contained in his 95 Theses and elsewhere.

Exsurge Domine is a document of startling antiquity today. It shows how starkly foreign to us the medeival mind is. It begins with an exhortation to Jesus (the “Dominus”) to remember how he acted before and to act accordingly now:

“Remember your reproaches to those who are filled with foolishness all through the day. Listen to our prayers, for foxes have arisen seeking to destroy the vineyard whose winepress you alone have trod. When you were about to ascend to your Father, you committed the care, rule, and administration of the vineyard, an image of the triumphant church, to Peter, as the head and your vicar and his successors. The wild boar from the forest seeks to destroy it and every wild beast feeds upon it.”

Even the Greeks, who mostly held their gods in contempt, approached divinity with more humility. And they rarely tried to enforce contracts with their gods (principally because they knew the gods were experts at cheating expectations). Peter and Paul as well as the whole Church are also commanded to arise to protect the benefit of the bargain Jesus made with Peter in turning over matters of faith on Earth to him and his heirs and assigns for ever. The presumption of the document is perhaps a small matter given the presumptions the Church intended by the death and eternal damnation of Luther. Among Luther’s heresies (which the Pope points out were spawned by the “father of lies” and which “must be destroyed at their very birth by your intercession and help, so they do not grow or wax strong like your wolves”) were the following:

1. It is a heretical opinion, but a common one, that the sacraments of the New Law give pardoning grace to those who do not set up an obstacle.

13. In the sacrament of penance and the remission of sin the pope or the bishop does no more than the lowest priest; indeed, where there is no priest, any Christian, even if a woman or child, may equally do as much.

17. The treasures of the Church, from which the pope grants indulgences, are not the merits of Christ and of the saints.

19. Indulgences are of no avail to those who truly gain them, for the remission of the penalty due to actual sin in the sight of divine justice.

20. They are seduced who believe that indulgences are salutary and useful for the fruit of the spirit.

23. Excommunications are only external penalties and they do not deprive man of the common spiritual prayers of the Church.

25. The Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, is not the vicar of Christ over all the churches of the entire world, instituted by Christ Himself in blessed Peter.

33. That heretics be burned is against the will of the Spirit.

37. Purgatory cannot be proved from Sacred Scripture which is in the canon.

And so forth. Some of these “heresies” strike at the very core of the Roman Church itself. Others, such as the question which set Luther down this path, namely his opinions about Indulgences, merely struck at the ability of the Church to rebuild St. Peter’s Basilica (in the particular case) or raise money for other ventures. But when power claims to be absolute (and divine) then all questioning presents a grave danger. That’s why the response from absolute divine authority much always remind one of Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor.

The bull itself gave Luther three times twenty days from publication in specified places in Saxony. The time expired on December 10, 1520. On that day Luther was in Wittenberg where he stationed himself at the Elster Gate and burned the Encyclical. In one of the acts of Luther that resounded perniciously through German history, he also tossed into the flames books — volumes of Canon Law. (In defense of Luther’s book burning, or at least to show he did not invent the tradition, the act was in response to the burning of Luther’s own writings by Inquisitor Johann Maier von Eck.) And thus completed the first act — started with Luther’s letter to the Archbishop of Mainz and Magedburg (and possibly nailed to the door of All Saints’ Church) on October 31, 1517. The Act was an important one (and a courageous one, especially for a man who sought to avoid controversy and for that reason entered a monestary rather than pursue the law degree that his father saved for out of his painfully acquired small treasure). It and numerous others before and after it merged into a deluge that would result in rending Europe, excite and then disappoint the most oppressed of men (the peasants), result almost 100 years later in the greatest slaughter of men, women and children ever known (until the Twentieth Century), permitted the questioning of accepted wisdom on such a vast scale and by such a variety of people not conceived of since the Greeks and ended one of the forms of absolute ignorance imposed on mankind from time to time. It also thrust into the symbolic role of national founder a man, tormented as he was by personal demons and intellectually deficient in critical respects, not suited for that role.

Whatever ultimate failings as a man and whatever crimes he imparted to the German people, Luther remains one of the most important Western figures for more than anyone else having caused history to pivot around him at a signifcant joint, and he remains one of the few who did this without direct control over armies.  Erikson compares him to Freud in the sense that both had

“one characteristic in common: a grim willingness to do the dirty work of their respective ages: for each kept human conscience in focus in an era of material and scientific expansion. Luther referred to his early work as ‘im Schlamm arbeiten,’ ‘to work in the mud, and complained that he worked all alone for ten years …” (Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (NY: Norton ed.: 1962) p9).

Erikson reminds us that Luther has something to do with Schweitzer, mainly through his creation of a German language through which simple prayers could be shared by the commoners of the nation. But perhaps Luther is given too much credit for all this, and maybe he has suffered too much blame, for history is a river that is channeled by geological forces larger than any one man. But it is not a coincidence that Luther was there, right in the water, when history meandered abruptly.

Of course being in the water when the river turns is not enough. Nikolai Bukharin was in such water, did nothing and drowned.  Leon Trotsky attempted something in the same spot, but it wasn’t enough and he too perished. What allows someone to survive the historical eddies of a historical crisis is something amenable to particular historical analysis. In Luther’s case, he was able to survive the whirlpool because cross-currents of imperial ambition of the Holy Roman Emperor, the interests of the Church in placating the Elector of Saxony (the sovereign of the land Wittenberg was located in) for unrelated reasons, and the Elector’s own interest in ruling as a Christian prince all acted against each other to prevent Luther from being disposed of simply for having a principled view on the theological effect of indulgences. Otherwise, the Church was perfectly capable of eliminating the Luther problem (which at bottom was only a threat to a revenue stream), as it had other irritants, Jan Hus being a not-too-distant example.

But once someone in those circumstances survives the currents, he becomes not so much a particular historical phenomenon as a cultural artifact. Luther has long since been, if not like Paul of Tarsus “all things to all men,” at least  a great many things, depending on what you are looking for and from where you are looking. Here we’ll see four different Luthers, all more or less contradictory, all from different vantages, there being no authorized version of Luther remaining.

I. The Philosopher’s Luther (Nietzsche’s Luther)

The virtue of starting with Nietzsche is that one or perhaps all of his opinions about Luther is likely to be true. This is not because he engaged in significant critical analysis of Luther or even because he read much of or much about Luther. It’s mainly because Nietzsche held so many different and contradictory views of Luther that there must be some truth to some of them.

Nietzsche, born in the heart of Lutheranism, in what was Saxony in Luther’s day, 60 km from Luther’s birthplace in Eisleben and 100 km from Wittenberg University and All Saints Church. His father was a Lutheran pastor. At 10 he attended a private school which served the respectable bourgeoisie. Through this all he undoubtedly grew up with the traditional German view of Luther: the savior of Christendom, the man who rescued Germany from the dark ages that Rome presided over, the opponent of the Inquisitors, who threatened all freedom of thought. His background was as solidly German provincial Protestant as was Schweitzer’s. As he became something of an intellectual dilettante in school, he probably added the invention of modernity and creation of the German language to Luther’s credits. If during his youth he thought much of Luther, it was undoubtedly in the stolid German way a budding conventional German intellectual did. He and his friends were typical German romantics. They founded a youthful literary society that they called “Germania,” and he and his friends were devoted to the German heritage of art music. Nietzsche attempted to add to that tradition with his teenage Miserere and his attempts at a Christmas Oratorio.  It was just after he and his friends pooled their funds to buy a piano score of Tristan that he visited Luther’s house in Eisleben with his schoolmate Wilhelm Pinder. This early association between Luther and Wagner was probably a coincidence but the two would become associated in Nietzsche’s mind — he would celebrate them together as part of an unbroken German tradition; and when the break came with Wagner, it also came with Luther.

Upon becoming securely part of the German intellectual establishment with his appointment as classics professor at the University of Basel (at the remarkably young age of 24 — like Luther he had a great facility for the classics, although both of them would be known for their invigoration of the German language), he had no reason to question Luther’s position at the heart of German culture and history.  A Lutheran world view (not exactly faith) was so much taken for granted that in 1875 he was able to write to fellow classicist Professor Erwin Rohde that the conversion to Catholicism (with a view to the priesthood) of a mutual friend shook him to his Lutheran soul:

“But now something you do not know and have a right to know, as my most intimate and sympathetic friend. We also — Overbeck and I – have a domestic problem, a household ghost; do not fall off your chair when you hear that Romundt has plans to enter the Roman Catholic Church and wants to become a priest in Germany. This transpired recently, but is a thought, as we later heard to our great alarm, which he has had for some time, but which is nearer to fruition now than ever before. This wounds me inwardly somewhat, and sometimes I feel it is the most wicked thing that anyone could do to me. Of course Romundt does not mean it wickedly; until now he has thought of nothing but himself, and the accursed accent he places on the ‘Save your own soul’ idea makes him quite indifferent to everything else, including friendship. It has gradually become a mystery to Overbeck and me that R. should have nothing more in common with us and was annoyed or bored by everything that inspired or stirred us; especially, he has bouts of peevish silence, which have worried us for some time past. Eventually there came confessions and now, almost every three days, some clerical explosions. The poor fellow is in a desperate state and beyond help – that is, he is so drawn by obscure intentions that to us he seems like a walking velleity. Our good, pure, Protestant atmosphere! Never till now have I felt so strongly my inmost dependence on the spirit of Luther and does the unhappy fellow mean to turn his back now on all these liberating influences? I wonder if he is in his right mind and if he should not undergo medical treatment with cold baths. I find it so incomprehensible that, right beside me, after eight years of intimacy, this ghost should have risen up. And ultimately it will be me to whom the stain of this conversion will attach. God knows, I say this not out of egoistic anxiety but I too believe that I represent something holy and am deeply ashamed when it is suspected of me that I have had anything to do with this utterly odious Catholic business.” (Christopher Middleton (ed. & trans.), Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (Hackett Publishing ed.: 1996) “Middleton collection,” 131-32.)

The Overbeck mentioned by Nietzsche was his house-mate, Franz Overbeck, since 1870 professor of New Testament Exegesis and Old Church History at the University of Bassel. Two years before Overbeck and Nietzsche had published books attacking “higher criticism” pioneer David Strauss. Nietzsche’s book was David Strauss: der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller (translated as David Strauss: the Confessor and the Writer), the first part of a planned but unfinished 13-part series entitled Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (translated as Thoughts Out of Season (Ludovici) or later Untimely Meditations (Kaufman)). The abuse it unleashed on the mild-manner historian was so unexpected, and from such a source, that it shocked and offended Strauss. Even Nietzsche must have realized that it was far more personal than warranted because, according to Ludovic, when Strauss died in 1874 Nietzsche agonized over whether his essay had hastened the historian’s death. Nietzsche’s object was to puncture the idealized version of progress imposed on history, largely as a result of the German cultural euphoria over the stunning victory in the Franco-Prussian war. Nietzsche believed that German society was ill-served by the military victory and had become decadent owing to the complacency of “Philistines.” He made Strauss into one for the point of his attack. Overbeck’s book How Christian is Our Present Day Theology? also disputed Strauss’s view of a modern theology. (In fact, Overbeck’s views would influence Nietzsche for some time.) But Overbeck expressed his opinion with a hope “for all of us theologians to be tolerant towards one another.” (See his preface to the first edition). Even though Overbeck would remains friends with Nietzsche until the end (it was he who came to minister to Nietzsche during the last crisis of mental illness), Overbeck was stunned by the viciousness of Nietzsche’s attack. He referred to Nietzsche’s essay as the “execution” of Strauss and wrote a friend at the time: “The only thing I find interesting about the fellow [Nietzche] is the psychological point—how one can get into such a rage with a person whose path one has never crossed, in brief, the real motive of this passionate hatred.” (See How Christian Is Our Present-Day Theology? trans. Martin Henry (T&T Clark: 2005), p5 n3.)

Of course all three of these productions (including Strauss’s which caused the overheated controversy) were well outside Lutheran theology, and the two theologians (Strauss and Overbeck) would never be offered another professorship.

But Nietzsche had not yet rejected Luther’s contributions to German culture.  Nietzsche had demolished Strauss as a “philistine” for embodying decadent German culture. Neither Richard Wagner nor Luther were not yet part of the decadence. In fact, at this point in his career, Wagner would be the way out of (the value added to) the valueless German culture.

Nietzsche met Wagner in 1868. (Nietzsche had been familiar with Wagner’s music since his student days when he and his friends scraped together the money to buy the piano score to Tristan, and Nietzsche worshipped Wagner from afar.) Both were in Leipzig at the time; Wagner incognito with his relatives. Nietzsche was invited by Wagner himself, when he learned that Nietzsche was the one who introduced Wagner’s sister to the Meisterlied. The day after the meeting, Nietzsche wrote to Rohde (November 9, 1868, Middleton Collection, 35-40), breathlessly, telling the story of “‘passing wondrous tales'” which he said “verged on the realm of fairy tale.” As he tells it, he played the part of Cinderella, complete with an adventure about dressing for the ball (his tailor was not a fairy godmother, however). It was a private party, not a ball, but Nietzsche felt the magic of meeting a prince. Wagner was charming and most charming of all to Nietzsche. He played all the parts of Meistersinger imitating all the voices. “He is, indeed, a fabulously lively and fiery man who speaks very rapidly, is very witty, and makes a very private party like this one an extremely gay affair.” Nietzsche chatted with him for a long time about Schopenhauer. “I enjoyed hearing him speak of Schopenhauer with indescribable warmth, what he owed to him, how he is the only philosopher who has understood the essence of music; then he asked how the academics nowadays regarded him, laughed heartily about the Philosophic Congress in Prague, and spoke of the ‘vassals of philosophy.’ But best of all, “when we were both getting ready to leave, he warmly shook my hand and invited me with great friendliness to visit him, in order to make music and talk philosophy also, he entrusted to me the task of familiarizing his sister and his kinsmen with his music, which I have now solemnly undertaken to do.”

Nietzsche, who had admired Wagner before, was now smitten; he was an acolyte. Four years later would appear Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik,  The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (1872) [the links to the German titles are to critical editions, which are based on the latest edition Nietzsche supervised; the parenthetical dates here are the dates of first publication]. The book exalted Aeschylus and Sophocles to the pinnacle of art; in fact, beyond art because only they were able to solve the existential problem of finding meaning and joy in a random senseless world. Their solution, affirming rather than rejecting human suffering, was soon lost when the Athenian rationalists, Socrates and the rest arrived. Even Euripides had lived in a time when too many of the virtues had decayed to understand the meaning of his two predecessors. Humans had never again found that meaning, until now: perhaps the art of Wagner could solve the existential crisis of our time!

Needless to say, Nietzsche’s fellow classicists derided such a sweeping reinterpretation of classical theater. Rohde and Wagner came to his rescue, but Nietzsche was no longer considered a classical scholar. Not that it mattered. Neitzche was no longer looking to German culture for the solution to his existential problem, much less the narrow field of German classical philology. He did not even bother to complete his notes for the intended publication of Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (Philosophy in the Tragic Time of the Greeks).

By 1875 Nietzsche was having doubts as well that Wagner was the answer to his existential dilemma. In fact, Nietzsche was no longer an acoyte. The draft of his Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (trans. Ludovici) was so unfavorable to Wagner that his friend and amanuensis “Peter Gast” (composer Heinrich Köselitz) persuaded him to soften it. And so it appeared, revised, in 1876, and Wagner and his disciples were pleased with the results.

It appeared as the fourth and last of his Untimely Meditations essays. Nietzsche was no longer interested in this long-term project (it had been two years since the third essay), and it appears from the essay that he was not writing about a real person.  The “biography” he gives of Wagner (Chapter VIII) is so “idealized,” Wagner is so much a type, that one could replace Wagner’s name with Luther’s (together with the point of their respective ambitions) and it would be as accurate (perhaps more so):

“Wagner’s actual life—that is to say, the gradual evolution of the dithyrambic dramatist in him—was at the same time an uninterrupted struggle with himself, a struggle which never ceased until his evolution was complete. His fight with the opposing world was grim and ghastly, only because it was this same world—this alluring enemy—which he heard speaking out of his own heart, and because he nourished a violent demon in his breast—the demon of resistance. When the ruling idea of his life gained ascendancy over his mind—the idea that drama is, of all arts, the one that can exercise the greatest amount of influence over the world—it aroused the most active emotions in his whole being. It gave him no very clear or luminous decision, at first, as to what was to be done and desired in the future; for the idea then appeared merely as a form of temptation—that is to say, as the expression of his gloomy, selfish, and insatiable will, eager for power and glory. Influence—the greatest amount of influence—how? over whom?—these were henceforward the questions and problems which did not cease to engage his head and his heart. He wished to conquer and triumph as no other artist had ever done before, and, if possible, to reach that height of tyrannical omnipotence at one stroke for which all his instincts secretly craved. With a jealous and cautious eye, he took stock of everything successful, and examined with special care all that upon which this influence might be brought to bear.”

When it came to identifying the genius of Wagner’s art, the reason he was placed in the German pantheon, Nietzsche picked a strange trait, a trait that Wagner supposedly shared with the other creators of German culture, Luther and Beethoven: “that essentially German gaiety, which characterised Luther, Beethoven, and Wagner …”

Gaiety — Heiterkeit (cheerfulness, serenity, mirth) — is probably not among the first adjective that comes to mind to describe this group. Although Beethoven toward the end of his life saluted Schiller’s version of joy in his last and most existential of symphonies, neither gaiety nor joy would describe his career.  Wagner of course made that first ball gay for Nietzsche, and he had his Meistersinger rather late in life (right before Nietzche met him), and also earlier produced piano versions of Beethoven’s Ode to Joy symphony as well as Haydn’s Drum Roll Symphony (Hob I:103), Strauss’s Wine Women and Song and other playful pieces.  But of Nietzsche’s trio, Luther is the only one who throughout life made cheerfulness something of a duty. When he was at Eisenbach for the few years of his late teens (the one place during his whole life that he was not constantly confronted with either beatings or demons), he was called by a class-mate a “lively, cheerful fellow,” and as Richard Friedenthal continues:

“The word cheerful (fröhlich) is inseparable from Luther’s character. It occurs constantly in his writings, and not by accident. He used it even in his important polemic works, and in the preface to his translation of the Bible. In immediate juxtaposition to this cheerfulness, however, was his heritage of severe melancholy, his tendency to brook, to torment himself, which he referred to as the ‘knots’ in his soul ….” (Luther: His Life and Times (trans. John Nowell) (New York: c1970).)

Did Nietzsche know any of this?  It probaby doesn’t matter because Nietzsche was no longer deaing with real historical people either with the dead Luther or with the live Wagner. He no longer needed Schopenhauer, or, as it seems, Rohde.

Nietzsche was now beginning a phase when his respect for historical German culture had been reduced as much as his interest in extended logical argument. Nietzsch had now become an aphorist, because that was the form that best expressed how he saw things. (Coincidently, aphorisms were the only kind of classical literature that Luther had any affinity for and the only kind he quoted — he had no particular interest in lyrics or epics; only brief phrases to prove a moral point. Niezsche the classicist had become the aphorist to deride the morality of the moralist who had no use for classicism except for its aphorisms.) From Meschliches, Allzumenschliches I (Human, All Too Human Part I) (1878):

Reaction as Progress.—Occasionally harsh, powerful, impetuous, yet nevertheless backward spirits, appear, who try to conjure back some past era in the history of mankind: they serve as evidence that the new tendencies which they oppose, are not yet potent enough, that there is something lacking in them: otherwise they [the tendencies] would better withstand the effects of this conjuring back process. Thus Luther’s reformation shows that in his century all the impulses to freedom of the spirit were still uncertain, lacking in vigor, and immature. Science could not yet rear her head. Indeed the whole Renaissance appears but as an early spring smothered in snow. But even in the present century Schopenhauer’s metaphysic shows that the scientific spirit is not yet powerful enough: for the whole mediaeval Christian world-standpoint and conception of man once again, notwithstanding the slowly wrought destruction of all Christian dogma, celebrated a resurrection in Schopenhauer’s doctrine. There is much science in his teaching although the science does not dominate, but, instead of it, the old, trite ‘metaphysical necessity.’ It is one of the greatest and most priceless advantages of Schopenhauer’s teaching that by it our feelings are temporarily forced back to those old human and cosmical standpoints to which no other path could conduct us so easily. The gain for history and justice is very great. I believe that without Schopenhauer’s aid it would be no easy matter for anyone now to do justice to Christianity and its Asiatic relatives—a thing impossible as regards the christianity that still survives. After according this great triumph to justice, after we have corrected in so essential a respect the historical point of view which the age of learning brought with it, we may begin to bear still farther onward the banner of enlightenment—a banner bearing the three names: Petrarch, Erasmus. Voltaire. We have taken a forward step out of reaction.” (From “Von den ersten und letzten Dingen” (“Of the First and Last Things”) no. 36, translation by Alexander Harvey.)

It was the Church that powered progress — now seen as humanism; Luther was a reactionary check at best. Luther was nihilism; Erasumus was enlightenment.

From Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II (Human, All Too Human Part II) (1879):

What is truth?Schwarzert (Melanchton): ‘One often preaches one’s faith precisely when one has lost it and is looking for it everywhere – and at such a time one does not preach it worst!’ – Luther: Thou speak’st true today like an angel, brother! – Schwarzert: ‘But it is thy enemies who think this thought and they apply it to thee.’ Luther: Then it’s a lie from the Devil’s behind.” (From “Der Wanderer und sein Schatten” (“The Wanderer and His Shadow”) no. 66, translation by R.J. Hollingdale.)

And so now, seemingly out of nowhere, Luther is a reactionary (and so is Wagner’s favorite philosopher Schopenhauer) as well as a craven hypocrite.

But it wasn’t really out of nowhere. Nietzsche was now deep into the process of unraveling German history and this called for rethinking Luther and later reading about Luther in depth. Soon he would be drawn to the one-sided anti-Reformation history by Johannes Janssen. On October 5, 1879, Nietzsche wrote “Peter Gast”:

“Dear friend, as for Luther, I have for a long time been incapable of saying honestly anything respectful about him: the after-effect of a huge collection of material about him, to which Jakob Burckhardt drew my attention. I am referring to Janssen, Geschichte des deutschen Vokes, vol. 2, which appeared only this year (I have a copy). Here, for once it is not a question of the falsified Protestant construction of history that we have been taught to believe in. At the moment it seems to me merely a matter of national taste in the north and the south which makes us prefer Luther, as a human being, to Ignatius Loyola. Luther’s hideous, arrogant, peevishly envious abusiveness – he felt out of sorts unless he was wrathfully spitting on someone – has quite disgusted me. Certainly you are right about the ‘promotion of European democratization’ coming through Luther but certainly too this raging enemy of the peasants (who had them beaten to death like mad dongs and expressly told the princes that they could now acquire the kingdom of heaven by slaughtering the brute peasant rabble) was one of the most unintentional promoters of it. I grant that you have the more charitable attitude toward him. Give me time!” (See Middleton collection, pp169-70).

Time, however, would not improve the opinion. Nietzsche would now condemn Luther as well as his own former position in the society Luther made (note the gibe at philologists) and essentially the historical basis for the German nation altogether. And this because he saw Luther as attacking the “superior men” of the Church. Luther was a fraud, evidently because Loyola was Nietzche’s Superman! Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science) (1882), no 358:

“The Lutheran Reformation, in all its length and breadth, was the indignation of the simple against something ‘complicated’; to speak cautiously, it was a coarse, honest misunderstanding. Today we can see plainly that, with regard to all the cardinal power issues, Luther was fatally limited, superficial and imprudent. He fumbled, he tore things up, he handed over the holy books to everyone; which meant that they got into the hands of the philologists, that is, the destroyers of any belief based on books. He demolished the concept of ‘church’ by repudiating faith in the inspiration of the councils; for the concept of ‘church’ can only remain vigorous as long as it is presupposed that the inspiring Spirit which had founded the Church still lives in her, still builds her, still continues to build its own dwelling-house.

“He gave back sexual intercourse to the priest: but three-quarters of the reverence of which the people are capable (and particularly the women of the people) rests on the belief that a man who is exceptional in this regard will also be exceptional in other matters. It is precisely here that the popular belief in something superhuman in man, in the miraculous, in the saving God in man, has its most subtle and suggestive advocate. Having given the priest a wife, he had to take from him auricular confession. Psychologically this was appropriate, but thereby he practically did away with the Christian priest himself, whose profoundest utility was ever consisted in his being a sacred ear, a silent well, a grave for secrets.

“‘Every man his own priest?’ such expressions and their peasant cunning concealed, in Luther, the profound hatred of the ‘superior man’ and the rule of the ‘superior man’ as conceived by the Church. Luther destroyed an ideal, which he did not know how to attain, while seeming to combat the degeneration thereof. It was he, who could not be a monk, who repudiated the rule of homines religiosi; he consequently brought about within the ecclesiastical social order precisely what he so impatiently fought against in the civil order, namely, a ‘peasant revolt.’ He knew not what he did.”

And so it was Luther who killed God, because he could not be a monk. But it would take Zarathustra to tell us flat out, and to do so Nietzsche wrote Also sprach Zarathustra (1883) in the very style that Luther employed in translating the Bible. By so doing did Nietzsche hand his own book over to the philologists?

Zarathustra, was too contrary, too cynical, too disrespectful for its time and place. It ended Nietzsche’s academic career, and Nietzsche knew it when Leipzig refused him a lecturer’s post he sought. He had lost his serious German reading public as well. 1886 found him trying to buy back the rights to his published works from his publisher Ernst Schmeitzner so that he could publish them at his own expense. He finally made an agreement and broke with Schmeitzner. The relationship had been fraying for years. Schmeitzner lost money when Human, All to Human was “practically banned” in Bayreuth and a “grand excommunication … pronounced against its author” (Middleton collection, p167). Nietzsche later believed he was withholding money from him and for nefarious reaons refusing to publish his works. Nietzsche claimed to be glad his work was free from that “antisemetic dump.” Now Nietzsche could publish on his own. So he made a virtue of necessity, and he spent the year preparing reissues of earlier works. He also published  Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil) (1886). The book was the logical conclusion of Zarathustra. This last book now proved his quest to relieve Germany of it cultural nihilism would end in what appeared to be utter intellectual nihilism. Nietzsche who first objected to the moral relativism of the dialectic had now become neither a thesis or a synthesis, but only the grand antithesis. The last book Nietzsche supervised the publication of was Der Fall Wagner (The Case against Wagner) (1888), and it officially closed the book on Wagner. The Birth of Tragedy (at least the part with Nietzsche hopeful solution) was negated — Wagner was part of the nihilistic culture, not the solution.

Nietzsche would attempt an autobiography, but he would not live to see it published. His remaining works would be “edited” by his sister with Overbeck objecting. Nietzsche himself now shared in the fate of his literary doppelgänger, Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus, although, as it turns out, his mental illness was not the result of syphilis (but then again maybe Adrian Leverkühn did not either). He summoned his friends like Leverkühn with a promise of a great work, but it was not to be. He lived out his remaining life in silence.

His autobiography, however, will provide for us his last word on Luther. It comes from the “Der Fall Wagner” section (at 2) of the Ecce Homo manuscript. As dismissive as he was about Wagner, he was now even more so about Luther. Luther was not just a false hope, a contributor to nihilism, he was in fact the first of a criminal conspiracy:

“There is an imperial German historiography, indeed, I fear, an anti-Semitic one, — there is a court historiography, and Mr von Treitschke knows no shame … recently an idiotic judgment in historical matters, a sentence by the Swabian esthete Vischer, now fortunately faded from the scene, made its rounds in the German newspapers as a ‘truth’ which every German should recognize: ‘The Renaissance and the Reformation must be joined together to make a whole—the esthetic rebirth and the moral rebirth.’—I lose patience when I hear such sentences, and I feel a desire, indeed, a duty, to tell the Germans all the things they have on their conscience! All the great cultural crimes of four centuries are on their conscience! … And always for the same reason, because of their internalized cowardice in the face of reality, which is also a cowardice in the face of the truth, which they have made into their instinctive untruth, from ‘idealism.'”

Treitschke, of course, was a militaristic blowhard and sychopantic disciple of Bismark; it’s hard to layhim at Luther’s feet. Friedrich Vischer was a Hegalian and a democrat in 1848-49, and each of those is enough for Nietzsche to scorn. But Nietzsche had long ago opined that Luther was not intentionally a democrat. Nevertheless, the heroic synthesis of Church and Reformation is something that Nietzsche had always treated  with contempt. Nietzsche was surrounded by anti-Semitism at the time, personally not only with Wagner and Schmeitzner but also with his sister and brother-in-law (who had gone off to Paraguy to found “New Germany”). Germany as a whole was becoming seized with a xenophobic fear of the Jew from the East. It would not be long before it would be turned on the Jew within. Luther of course himself had many thought crimes on that score to his name. Did he also commit crimes of incitement too? And was there four centuries of cultural crimes that stemmed from the Reformation? Is that all that remains of Luther’s legacy, which is simply preserved by “cowardice in the face of reality”?

Perhaps, but the cultural critic’s tools are no freer from Idealism than the politician’s. And while aphorisms are perhaps not the medium to make make the charge, they are not the tools for proving them. So questions concerning the historical forces released by Luther’s rebellion will have to be examined, next, by the dissecting probes of historical materialism, in the next part.